The Place of Specialised Sciences in Max Scheler’s Philosophy with a Particular Focus on Philosophical Anthropology

Abstract

The aim of the article is to clarify the nature of the cooperation between philosophy and specialised sciences proposed by Scheler. Reflections on types of cognition lead to the conclusion that neither the facts nor the methods of specialised sciences can be directly used by philosophy. The former must be ‘cleared’ of the assumptions that burden them and of all kinds of ‘insertions’. The latter may perform an auxiliary role at best, as the main burden of responsibility for philosophical cognition rests on the phenomenological method. It consists of successively conducted reductions (transcendental, psychological, eidetic), which are to open us to the space of pure possibility. Scheler’s himself does not always consistently implement his methodological postulates. In practice, he often refers to the facts of specialised sciences and makes inductive generalisations concerning problems of a philosophical nature. A phenomenological experience which is precisely executed, free of assumptions, and essence-oriented is, therefore, not the only source of the theses he supports.