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Trust in Government as a Factor Influencing Acceptance of Behavioural Public Policy Instruments: Example of Poland and Selected Countries

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ABSTRACT

Objective: To assess public support of selected nations with regard to various types of nudges introduced by behavioural public policy and the level of trust these nations have in their governments as the creators of these policies.

Research Design & Methods: The article is based on literature studies, descriptive and comparative analysis along with statistical analysis of quantitative data derived from nudge acceptance surveys conducted (representative research samples, with the same methodology and questionnaire) in Poland and other countries analysed, as well as from the World Values Survey studies carried out in these countries.

Findings: In the countries analysed, citizens approve of most of the nudges presented to them. There is much greater variation in these countries in terms of trust in the government. The analysis of the relationships between both variables indicates that there is no simple linear relationship, i.e. there is neither an unambiguously positive nor negative relationship between the analysed

variables. It is rather a U-shaped relationship. The division of the surveyed countries into four groups is also visible.

Implications/Recommendations: The lack of trust in the government proven in the analysis may, in certain countries, be a factor that inhibits the acceptance of the tools introduced by the government and prevents or delays desired behavioural changes. In such a situation, an appropriate solution might be to create a behavioural team that could operate independently of the government and bring together experts who, with greater knowledge, would make better decisions regarding behavioural changes in societies. Governments can also use behavioural science to build trust among the public.

Contribution: Enhancing knowledge of the potential use of behavioural public policy instruments and attempting to assess and benchmark trust in government and acceptance of these instruments in selected countries. The conclusions from the conducted research can be used by both practitioners and theoreticians in the field of public policy.

Article type: original article.

Keywords: behavioural insights, behavioural public policy instruments, trust in government, comparative studies of countries.

JEL Classification: D78, D91, O57.

1. Introduction

Recent trends in shaping public policy are based on the increased contribution of behavioural sciences towards presenting a picture of complex human behaviour being influenced by a variety of factors such as desires and needs, social norms and values, infrastructural and institutional context, as well as the economic and political climate (Benartzi *et al*., 2017). These findings of the behavioural sciences focusing on the behaviour of real people and their decision-making, constitute elements of behavioural knowledge that should be implemented in public policy, its design, implementation, and the evaluation of its instruments (Mont, Lehner & Heiskanen, 2014, p. 9; Ewert, 2020, p. 340). This knowledge contributes to the formulation of behavioural insights (BI) relating to an evidence-based understanding of behavioural determinants, and how behaviour can be adjusted (Dewies *et al*., 2022). BI is a tool based on the assumption that context and behavioural biases influence decision-making, representing additional sources of market inefficiencies. Governments need to intervene in order to correct these biases and, as people are the most fundamental target group of policymaking, the use of BI is essential for the design of effective public policies (Sevgin, 2020).

Public policy using BI, referred to as behavioural public policy (BPP), includes all measures and modes of public policy aimed at influencing human behaviour with insights from behavioural science (Straßheim, 2020, p. 116). It offers decision-

-makers clear choices as to which instrument or course of action can lead to better outcomes improving individual and social well-being (John, 2016, p. 129; 2023). It is intended to bring about small changes (costs) and significant improvements (benefits) (Sevgin, 2020). The behavioural interventions implemented are the type of interventions that comprise, for example, providing information, appealing to values and norms, reinforcing commitment and restructuring choice options, i.e. using so-called nudges (Stern, 2020). Nudges have been widely adopted by governments of different ideological beliefs (Halpern & Sanders, 2016; OECD, 2017a). They are now considered the most visible sub-type of BPP (Straßheim, 2020, p. 116) and the most popular type of policy intervention suggested by behaviourists (Lades & Nova, 2022).

In public policy research, widespread acceptance of policies has been identified as a key determinant for their success (John, Martin & Mikołajczak, 2023). In recent years, public opinion has become even more important for policy success due to the decline in political trust, among other factors (Torcal & Christmann, 2021; OECD, 2022). Political trust is the confidence of citizens in a government or political system (Miller, 1974). Two subcategories of trust can be distinguished: systemic trust and institutional trust, which are two important dimensions for measuring political trust (Tang & Huhe, 2014). Institutional trust, being citizens' trust in public institutions, is essential to the functioning of many governance processes enabling public bodies to plan and implement policies, and deliver services (OECD, 2017b; UNDP, 2021).

On the one hand, it is recognised that the application of BI to public policy can help restore people's trust in the ability of governments to solve new and old problems, making governments more effective and citizen-focused (OECD, 2015, p. 9). On the other hand, there is a theoretical link between trust in public institutions and support for nudges. People who have more trust in government would be more likely to accept nudges proposed by the government (Sunstein, Reisch & Kaiser, 2019, p. 1423).

Assessing public support in selected nations with regard to various types of nudges introduced by public policy and the level of trust these nations have in their governments as policy makers becomes, therefore, an important research field in the evaluation of BPP. The main objective of the study is to try to answer the question of whether higher levels of trust in government in economies are associated with greater acceptance of nudges therein? The article uses literature studies, descriptive and comparative analysis along with statistical analysis of quantitative data derived from nudges acceptance surveys conducted in the analysed countries as well as from the World Values Survey studies carried out in these countries.

The study is divided into four main sections. The section following the introduction reviews the literature on nudges as an instrument of the BPP and trust in the government. The third section describes the research methodology and data used

in the analysis, and the fourth section presents the results of the analysis of nudge acceptance and trust in government in 17 countries. The article concludes with a section presenting the main insights from the analysis and a discussion.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Nudge and Nudging

Nudge is the most popularised SB application that has emerged under the auspices of libertarian paternalism (Kuehnhanss, 2019) referred to as the "third way" (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 252) or the "middle way" (Schlag, 2010, p. 914) between traditional paternalism and libertarianism. This is a political approach that preserves freedom of choice (i.e. libertarianism), but encourages the public sector to steer people in directions that will promote their own welfare (i.e. paternalism) (Mont, Lehner & Heiskanen, 2014, p. 19). By developing interventions rooted in behavioural insights and grounded in libertarian paternalism, Thaler and Sunstein created a new behavioural programme called the "behavioural paradigm" or the "nudge paradigm" (Lehner, Mont & Heiskanen, 2016).

The literature offers numerous definitions of nudge, although these do not fully reflect its essence. The term should be understood as "(...) interventions that steer people in certain directions, but at the same time allow them to go their own way" (Sunstein & Reisch, 2019). The creators of the nudge concept offer a following explanation (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 6): "Any aspect of choice architecture that alters people's behaviour in a predictable way without excluding any options or significantly altering their economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid."

According to these authors, the decision-making environment can be created and changed accordingly by influencing the conditions of decisions, and the formulation of an interpretive framework for individual decisions has a great impact on the outcome. The activity of organising the context in which a decision is made has been referred to as choice architecture, and the manipulation of choice as nudging (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, pp. 3, 236). Hence, nudge is an intervention made by changing the presentation of choices that alters people's behaviour in predictable ways. It is any intervention in the structure of a decision context. Replacing one decision context with another is justified, if there is evidence that one option is actually better than the other, and the new context leads to the better option being chosen more frequently. At the same time, nudges preserve freedom of choice because they do not forbid any options nor change economic incentives.

Changing the context of decision-making may, in some cases, counteract errors made by people in the decision-making process without significant negative side

effects. Public decision-makers using nudging can predictably modify citizens' behaviour by manipulating their choice environment (Hortal, 2023).

While behavioural interventions are addressed to individuals, they very often focus on a social goal. Research on choice architecture has shown that in many cases it is possible to protect freedom of choice and promote social goals by structuring the decision-making environment in such a way that the expressed interests of individuals are more closely linked to social goals (Sunstein, 2013). These so-called social nudges (Nagatsu, 2015) are interventions based on insights from social psychology and sociology (Brandon *et al*., 2019). They reveal important information about other people's behaviour, raise normative expectations about what is desirable, can be shared and communicated online or offline, and use social incentives and sanctions to regulate individual and group behaviour (van der Linden, 2018).

The policy field often referred to as nudging is considered to be the idea that small, inexpensive changes, tailored to the human mind, can significantly improve public policy, relying heavily on encouraging citizens to do things they would agree to after reasonable consideration (John, 2018). Architects of choice (e.g., policy-makers) indirectly engage in signalling social norms that can be accepted or rejected by individuals (Tankard & Paluck, 2016). Individuals who reject the norm show a boomerang effect, caused, for example, by the fact that the architect of choice is perceived as an opponent of the individuals' own (political) ideology (Costa & Kahn, 2013) and is not trusted (Schubert, 2017). Different types of public interventions may, therefore, not be supported by citizens and can be counterproductive (John, 2018).

2.2. Political and Institutional Trust

Trust is the subject of numerous studies by philosophers, social psychologists, sociologists, political scientists and economists. There is no consensus in the literature on the definition of trust, so there are various explanations of this phenomenon using relational and situational elements and combinations thereof. The issue is of a complex nature; trust is both something we do and an attitude we can have and adopt (Faulkner, 2018).

Trust is the basis of all human contact and institutional interactions and can be defined as the willingness of one party to rely on the other party to honour commitments (Blind, 2007, p. 3). Trust is also explained as an individual's assessment that another person, whether acting as an individual, as a member of a group, or in an institutional role, has the motivation and competence to act in the interests of the individual and will do so without supervision and monitoring (Warren, 2018, p. 75). Trust is also defined as the belief that people (companies, institutions) will not: 1) make promises they know they cannot keep, 2) deviate from promises they can

keep, 3) violate norms in order to exploit people who follow them (Keefer *et al*., 2020, p. 42).

Emphasising the attitudes of subjects or relational and situational elements in the definition of trust means that many potential dimensions of trust can be distinguished, which certainly interact with each other. Two broad categories of trust can be observed in the literature: particularised and generalised trust. Particularised trust refers to trust in a known individual, whereas generalised trust refers to trust in persons (or systems) not known personally (Bjørnskov, 2007).

One of the main subcategories of particularised trust is a political trust (Melios, 2020, p. 3). It includes broad trust in government or trust in democracy, as well as trust in more specific institutions and groups, such as the civil service, parliament and individual elected officials (Norris, 2017, p. 24). It consists of the two elements of systemic trust and institutional trust. Systemic trust refers to trust in the state regime and system (e.g. democracy and its institutions), while institutional trust refers to general trust in public institutions (Xiaoxiao & Zhou, 2022).

Institutional trust concerns formal rules introduced and enforced by the state (Bentkowska, 2023). Institutional trust is a product of assessments based on economic or procedural performance. It is higher when political actors and institutions achieve high levels of procedural and policy performance (Hakhverdian & Quinton, 2012; van der Meer & Hakhverdian, 2017). However, the literature also highlights that institutional trust is based on the concept of generalised trust passed down through the socialisation process from one generation to the next according to social and cultural norms (Lahno, 2001; Kaasa & Andriani, 2022). Therefore, a lack of trust in authority may be the result of certain cultural characteristics related to widespread distrust (low generalised trust), but also the poor performance observed in everyday life (Bentkowska, 2023).

Institutional trust is the degree to which individuals accept and perceive institutions as benevolent, competent, trustworthy and accountable to citizens (Devos, Spini & Schwartz, 2002). These can be explained by subjective perceptions of the public or by objective indicators of government competence, fairness and impartiality (Norris, 2022, p. 34). Holding a position of a trustworthy government requires the policies developed by officials to reflect the values and interests of diverse and pluralistic populations (Levi, 2022, p. 216). Citizens' lack of trust in government distorts their policy preferences, reducing support for public policies, and these policies may become less effective (Keefer *et al*., 2020, p. 47). Trust in institutions is essential for functioning of a democratic government and society (Faulkner, 2018). It influences citizens' overall sense of safety and confidence, their sense of predictability and awareness of protection against existing risks, and their tendency towards pro-social attitudes (Sobiech, 2017; Faulkner, 2018).

The level of institutional trust of individuals may determine the evaluation and acceptance of public policies and their tools. If there is a lack of public support for a policy over a long period of time, a short-term success – based on its legality or even nudging – is less likely (John, 2011, p. 22).

3. Methodology and Data

The extent to which citizens accept behavioural public policy instruments in the form of nudges has so far been studied in various countries and has examined different individual nudges or sets of them (e.g. default options, green nudges, reminders, providing information). For the further analysis presented in this article, the results of surveys conducted by various authors in 18 countries have been selected (Reisch & Sunstein, 2016, Sunstein, Reisch & Rauber, 2018; Khadzhyradieva, Hrechko & Savkov, 2019; Sunstein & Reisch, 2019; Sunstein, Reisch & Kaiser, 2019; Miłaszewicz, 2023; Almqvist & Andersson, 2024). These countries are listed in Table 1. Some of these surveys were conducted in selected groups of countries (e.g. from Europe, the Americas or Asia), others in individual countries (e.g. Australia, Sweden, Ukraine and Poland). These countries were not selected according to any particular key for the original research. According to their authors, although the list of these countries is not complete, it includes a significant subset of the world's nations (Sunstein & Reisch, 2019). From the point of view of the analysis carried out in this article, it is important to note that in each of the 18 countries the survey research was conducted based on the same methodology and questionnaire.[1] It consisted of 49 questions designed to: obtain a broad characterisation of the research sample (15 questions), get respondents' assessment of health and life satisfaction (9 questions), their confidence, risks and concerns (10 questions) and attitudes towards the selected nudges as instruments of choice architecture (15 questions[2]). The formulation of the nudges selected for the study is presented in Table A.1 attached in the Appendix.

The same questionnaire was translated into different national languages. Some questions (e.g. on support for political parties, income level) were adapted to national conditions. In all countries, the survey questionnaires were close-ended and the order of nudges presented was randomised. In the countries analysed, surveys of support for hypothetical nudges were conducted between 2015 and 2020 and used

[1] An English-language version of the questionnaire was made available in the article by Sunstein, Reisch and Rauber (2018).

[2] With the exception of Sweden as subliminal advertising is prohibited and one of the original instruments (requirement: one meat-free day per week in canteens in public institutions – the last in Appendix) was considered to be an order that did not meet the definition of a nudge. In order to standardise the surveys, only 13 nudges in all the countries analysed were included in the final analysis of support for nudges and trust in government.

large-size research samples, representative of those countries, which increases the validity of their results. In each country, this was a random-quota sample, where quotas were selected according to representation in the national population of people aged 18 and over for gender, age, region of residence and, in certain cases, education. In each country, the survey was conducted using computer-assisted web interviewing (CAWI). The survey questionnaires provided to respondents were close-ended and, as recommended in the literature, did not use the original word "nudges" or its translation into national languages (de Quintana Medina, 2020, pp. 111–112). Respondents were only asked to declare their approval (acceptance) or disapproval (non-acceptance) of the same hypothetical nudges, without measuring the intensity of approval or disapproval on any scale. The percentage of respondents approving of a given BPP instrument was taken as an indicator of its approval (acceptance) in a given country. The first variable in the analysis carried out in the next section of the study was, therefore, the respondents' answers to the questions on acceptance of the selected nudges.

The second variable adopted in the analysis is the level of institutional trust in the countries surveyed. The questionnaires of the surveys on the acceptance of nudges specified that they are proposed by the government. Therefore, the level of trust in government identified in the World Values Survey (WVS) reports is presented as institutional trust. The source of the trust data was the report of the 7th wave of the WVS survey conducted between 2017 and 2020, containing data for 64 countries/territories. Under the current rules, each country is surveyed once per wave and the survey requires full and faithful implementation of a common questionnaire across all countries covered in one wave. In each country, the WVS questionnaire should be translated into all languages that are the first language for 15% (or more) of the population. In all countries random samples representative of the adult population were used, i.e. all persons aged 18 years and older living in private households in each country, regardless of their nationality, citizenship or language. The vast majority of surveys were conducted on a face-to-face interview basis using the following data collection methods: paper and pencil interview (PAPI) and computer-assisted personal interview (CAPI) (Haerpfer *et al*., 2022). For the analysis conducted in this study, the positive responses to the question: Can you say how much trust you have in the government? ("a great deal" and "quite a lot") were summed up and it was determined what proportion of respondents (in percentage terms) trust those in power in a given society. The results of this sum for the countries analysed were implemented as the second research variable.

These countries represent various geographical regions, different socio-economic systems, traditions, political regimes and cultural clusters discussed in the literature (Mensah & Chen, 2013). According to the Democracy Index, for most of them their systems reflect a chosen form of democracy in which the voice of citizens should

matter. Among the countries analysed here, only Ukraine and Mexico are categorised as hybrid countries, and China and Russia as authoritarian regimes (Economist Intelligence, 2022). With such a diverse research sample, an international comparative analysis should provide interesting results.

The research samples were analysed using well-known statistical methods of descriptive analysis. The analysis of relationship between these variables was conducted based on the results of the statistical analysis obtained and the use of the graphical method. There was also an attempt to determine the relationship between the variables under study based on various forms of regression function. Nevertheless, the estimated models of the relationship between the studied variables either did not imply statistically significant parameters or explained the studied relationship to a small extent (showed mismatches between the models and the studied phenomenon).[3]

4. Research Results and Discussion

The instruments analysed, characterised by varying levels of depth of public intervention in people's lives, are somewhat diverse in nature, trigger various systems of thinking, address different individual and social problems, and may, therefore, be perceived and evaluated in different ways by individual respondents. After rejecting two nudges (no. 8 and no. 15 – see Table A.1 in the Appendix and footnote 2), the first results of the analysis proved that, on average across countries, around 11 (SD = 1.3844) of the 13 nudges were approved by a simple majority, ranging from 8 in Denmark to 13 in China and South Korea (see Table 1). This means that a large majority of citizens in various countries approve of most of the nudges presented to them.

When comparing the acceptance rates of nudges, these countries can be divided into three distinct categories (e.g. Reisch & Sunstein, 2016; Sunstein, Reisch & Rauber, 2018):

1) nations that support nudges – mostly industrialised western democracies, where the vast majority of citizens approve of nudges, at least if they are perceived to be in line with the interests and values of the majority of citizens and do not have illegal aims (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Poland, Ukraine, USA, Italy and the UK),

2) nudge enthusiast nations – a small group of nations in which an overwhelming majority approve nearly all nudges (Brazil, China, South Korea, Russia and South Africa),

[3] Due to editorial limitations of the size of the article, these regression models and their estimation results are not shown.

3) nations cautiously in favour of nudges – a group of nations that generally show average approval of most nudges, but also much lower approval rates (Denmark, Hungary, Japan, Sweden).

Table 1. Support for Nudges and Trust in Government in the Analysed Countries

Number	Country	Number of Nudges Accepted by Simple Majority Vote	Support for Nudges (%)	Trust in the Government (%)
1	Australia	11	73.4	30.3
2	Brazil	12	81.5	22.5
3	Canada	10	71.5	46.1
4	China	13	86.4	94.6
5	Denmark	9	55.2	39.1
6	France	11	68.7	30.7
7	Germany	9	64.4	38.6
8	Great Britain	11	71.3	33.4
9	Hungary	9	57.9	37.6
10	Italy	11	72.5	29.3
11	Japan	8	59.8	39.9
12	Poland	11	68.2	23.1
13	Russia	11	75.8	53.0
14	South Africa[a]	9	77.0	.
15	South Korea	13	78.2	51.3
16	Sweden	11	57.4	50.7
17	Ukraine	11	70.7	18.9
18	USA	11	60.5	23.8
Descriptive statistics	Min	8 (Japan)	55.2 (Denmark)	18.9 (Ukraine)
	Max	13 (China, South Korea)	86.4 (China)	94.6 (China)
	Range	5	31.2	75.7
	Mean	10.6	69.0	39.0
	Median	11.0	70.7	37.6
	Standard deviation	1.37	8.62	17.25
	Variable coefficient	12.98	12.49	44.24
	Skewness	–0.0532	0.1339	1.9662

[a] Country excluded when calculating statistical measures due to lack of data on levels of trust in government.

Source: the author.

In each of the countries analysed, the average support for all nudges collectively is high, exceeding 55% (Table 1). However, it varies widely across the group of countries analysed. In China, which stands out as a nation demonstrating especially high enthusiasm for nudges, overall support for these instruments is particularly high, exceeding the lowest level of acceptance (in Denmark) by more than 31 percentage points (p.p.) and the average by more than 17 p.p. The variation in support for nudges among the surveyed nations is also evidenced by the large values of the standard deviation (the scatter of support scores around the average for all nations is more than 8.5 p.p.) and the coefficient of variation of 12.5% (the percentage of the standard deviation in the average level of support by the surveyed nations).

Noticeably more variation can be perceived, however, in terms of trust in the government. Here as well, China is in the lead, with almost 95% of citizens declaring very high or fairly high trust in their government. This is almost 76 p.p. higher than the minimum (in Ukraine) and 56 p.p. higher than the average in the analysed countries. There is also more than twice as much scatter in the level of trust in government in the surveyed countries around its average level (17.25 p.p.), accounting for more than 44% of its value (coefficient of variation). In addition, in as many as 11 countries it is lower than the average level of trust in government in the surveyed nations.



Fig. 1. Support for Nudges (Average in %) and Trust in Government (in %) in the Analysed Economies

Source: the author.

An analysis of the relationship between the two variables can be made on the basis of Figure 1. It clearly shows that we are not dealing with a simple linear rela-

tionship, i.e. there is neither an unambiguously positive nor negative relationship between the analysed variables in the studied countries. If the economies were divided into two groups, they would be almost the same size, and in the first one a negative relationship is discernible (Denmark, France, Japan, Germany, Poland, Ukraine, Hungary), while in the second group a positive one (Australia, China, Canada, South Korea, UK, Italy). However, Brazil would then have to be treated as an outlier, characterised by low trust in government and a very high level in the nudge support index.

In further analysis, however, average values were used and, due to them, it is possible to divide the analysed countries into four groups: with lower than average levels of acceptance of nudges and trust in the government (1st quarter: France, Poland, Hungary, USA); with lower than average levels of trust and higher than average levels of acceptance of nudges (2nd quarter: Australia, Brazil, Ukraine, UK, Italy); with higher than average levels of trust and acceptance of nudges (3rd quarter: China, Canada, South Korea, Russia); with higher than average levels of trust but lower than average levels of support for nudges (4th quarter: Denmark, Japan, Germany, Sweden).

There is a view in the literature that, compared to traditional interventions such as taxes and fines, citizens in general are more accepting of nudges and tend to welcome them in most countries if they promote goals that they themselves support and are implemented by parties with whom they can identify (Schmidt & Engelen, 2020). The results of the analysis obtained in this study therefore confirm that the level of acceptance of the presented public policy instruments is high. Respondents in the analysed countries overwhelmingly support nudges as long as they have legitimate social objectives and are in line with people's interests and values. The analysed hypothetical nudges relate to goals aimed at increasing social well--being (improving health, protecting the environment, helping the needy), and in most of the surveyed nations these BBP goals are accepted and supported by citizens. However, not all nudges directed at achieving these goals are supported to the same extent in the various nations.

The analysis proves that the theory formulated on the basis of previous studies stating that "people who have high trust in public institutions would be more willing to accept government nudging" (Sunstein, Reisch & Kaiser, 2019, p. 1423), and used to explain international differences in support for nudges (Sunstein, Reisch & Rauber, 2018), cannot be confirmed. According to this theory, one would expect a positive relationship between the level of acceptance of nudges and the level of trust in government, but as the analysis in this study shows, this is not the case. The group of nations identified as nudge enthusiasts includes Brazil, where citizens have little trust in government, while the group of nations cautiously in favour of nudges includes those where citizens have relatively high trust in government (Denmark, Japan,

Sweden). High trust in public institutions, therefore, does not necessarily imply greater support for nudging at the national level and does not explain international differences in acceptance of these BPP instruments. This observation would point to alternative explanations or a more complex relationship between the variables under study than suggested in the earlier literature.

5. Conclusion

Nudges represent a whole spectrum of public actions that, without limiting possible options, should improve choice. International research on them has shown that, in quite a number of cases, it is possible to structure the decision-making environment in such a way that the choices of individuals become more closely linked to social goals (Hertwig, 2017). The research presented in this paper fits into this broad research agenda by providing some insights and confirming (or not) the findings of studies conducted by other authors. It can also be helpful to public policy-makers and the architects of choice providing policy-makers, who are considering the use of nudges in their policy repertoire, with important information on the popularity of nudges.

Various insights emerge from the research conducted for this study. On the one hand, the goals promoted by the hypothetical nudges analysed are supported by the citizens of the countries studied. On the other hand, the lack of trust in the government shown in the analysis may, in some countries (e.g. Poland), be a factor inhibiting acceptance of the tools introduced by the government and inhibiting or delaying the desired behavioural changes suggested by the nudges (boomerang effect). It is known from previous research that support for nudges depends on the type of choice architect implementing the intervention and using these BPP tools (Tannenbaum, Fox & Rogers, 2017) as well as on the fact that people tend to be sceptical of government interventions while experts are seen as much more trustworthy than policy-makers (Evers *et al*., 2018). In a situation of low trust in government, an appropriate solution could be the creation of some type of behavioural team that could operate independently of government, but should bring together experts who are more knowledgeable and would make better decisions on behavioural change in societies. Such solutions are suggested by the results of a study in Sweden (Almqvist & Andersson, 2024). The third observation is based on the finding that the best way to earn trust is to deserve it (Sunstein, Reisch & Kaiser, 2019). Governments can use behavioural knowledge to build trust among the public. Therefore, when applying nudging, they should be guided by the Nudging Bill of Rights, which does not suggest judicially enforceable rights, but is a set of obligations that policy-makers should follow (Sunstein & Reisch, 2019, pp. 131–134): public officials must promote a legitimate purpose; nudges must respect individual rights and must be in line with people's values and interests; nudging must not manipulate people; nudges should

not take something from people and give it to others without their explicit consent and should be transparent rather than hidden.

The research presented in this paper has its own specificities and limitations. The specificity of the research is reflected in the selection of the research sample and the variables adopted for the analysis. The inclusion of other countries in the analysis and other examples of nudges may affect the results obtained. The research should be replicated. Socio-economic conditions, which have clearly changed in the international arena since the time of the study, will certainly affect the results obtained.

Conflict of Interest

The author declares no conflict of interest.

Appendix

Table A.1. Hypothetical Nudges

Number	Description of the Instrument
1	The government requires a "traffic lights" system for food, in which healthy food would be sold with a small green label, unhealthy food with a small red label, and food that are neither especially healthy nor especially unhealthy with a small yellow label
2	The government requires calorie labels at chain restaurants (such as McDonald's and Burger King)
3	The government encourages (without requiring) electricity providers to adopt a system in which consumers would be automatically enrolled in a "green" (environmentally friendly) energy supplier, but could opt out if they wished
4	A state law requiring people to say when they obtain their drivers' license whether they want to be organ donors
5	A state law requires all large grocery stores to place their most healthy food in a prominent, visible location
6	To reduce deaths and injuries associated with distracted driving, the national government adopts a public education campaign, consisting of vivid and sometimes graphic stories and images, designed to discourage people from texting, emailing, or talking on their cell phones while driving
7	To reduce childhood obesity, the national government adopts a public education campaign, consisting of information that parents can use to make healthier choices for their children
8[a]	The government requires movie theaters to provide subliminal advertisements (that is, advertisements that go by so quickly that people are not consciously aware of them) designed to discourage people from smoking and overeating
9	The government requires airlines to charge people, with their airline tickets, a specific amount to offset their carbon emissions (about 10€ per ticket); under the program, people can opt out of the payment if they explicitly say that they do not want to pay it

Table A.1 cnt'd

Number	Description of the Instrument
10	The government requires labels on products that have unusually high levels of salt, as in, "This product has been found to contain unusually high levels of salt, which may be harmful to your health"
11	The government assumes, on tax returns, that people want to donate 50€ to the Red Cross (or to another good cause) subject to opt out if people explicitly say that they do not want to make that donation
12	The government requires movie theaters to run public education messages designed to discourage people from smoking and overeating
13	The government requires large electricity providers to adopt a system in which consumers would be automatically enrolled in a "green" (environmentally friendly) energy supplier, but could opt out if they wished
14	To halt the rising obesity problem, the government requires large supermarket chains to keep cashier areas free of sweets
15[a]	For reasons of public health and climate protection, the government requires canteens in public institutions (schools, public administrations and similar) to have one meat-free day per week

[a] Instrument not considered for further analysis.

Source: Sunstein, Reisch & Rauber (2017, p. 7).

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